write a short paper about the original idea
Short Papers: Over the course of the semester, students will submit four short papers based on the readings/material covered in class. Each paper will count 10% towards the final course grade. These papers should be typed, double-spaced, and should be brief developments of original ideas inspired by the literature we have discussed. These should NOT be summaries of the course material, but rather demonstrate students’ original, critical thinking about the readings and effort towards applying the concepts to original issues/questions. At the same time, the papers are not expected to be fully developed at this stage. Instead, the “ideal” paper would be one that could serve as the basis for a full-fledged thesis and/or academic article with future development.
A summary of formal expectations will be provided early in the semester. ALL REFERENCES MUST BE PROPERLY CITED. If a student fails to properly cite another’s work, or if a student attempts to pass another’s work off as his or her own, he or she will receive a zero on the paper at a minimum, and potentially an ‘F’ for the course. IF YOU ARE UNSURE HOW TO PROPERLY CITE ANOTHER’S WORK, CHECK WITH THE PROFESSOR BEFORE SUBMITTING YOUR PAPER! Plagiarism, of any type, will not be tolerated.
- Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. (1978). “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo.”
- Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. (1995). “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits.”
- Crowley, George and William Reece. (2013). “Dynastic Political Privilege and Electoral Accountability: The Case of US Governors 1950-2005.”
- Leguizamon, J. Sebastian and George Crowley. (2016). “Term Limits, Time Horizons, and Electoral Accountability.”
- Politics as Exchange in the Legislature
- Weingast, Barry, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. (1981). “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics.”
- Chen, Jowei and Neil Malhotra. (2007). “The Law of k/n: The Effect of Chamber Size on Government Spending in Bicameral Legislatures.”
- Gilligan, Thomas and John Matsusaka. (1995). “Deviations from Constituent Interests: The Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States.”